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Collective Bargaining in Canadian 
Collèges and Universities 
Some Unresolved Dilemmas 
Donald D. Carter 
This paper deals with some of the basic problems 
created by the adoption of collective bargaining, procédures 
by faculty at Canadian collèges and universities. 
Collective bargaining is now becoming a fact of life for faculty at 
Canadian collèges and universities. In the collèges, faculty collective 
bargaining is now the norm, and it appears that in the universities there 
is a marked movement toward collective bargaining by faculty. In Que-
bec universities faculty collective bargaining is well established, while 
in Canadian universities outside of Québec there has been a rapidly 
growing interest in collective bargaining by faculty, demonstrated by 
the adoption of formai collective bargaining procédures at a handful of 
universities and the encouragement of collective bargaining by national 
and provincial faculty organizations. 
This paper will deal with some of the basic problems created by 
the adoption of collective bargaining procédures by faculty at Canadian 
collèges and universities. My failure to deal with support staff should 
not be construed as a downgrading of the collective bargaining activities 
of thèse employées. Collective bargaining by support staff, however, 
gives rise to a différent set of problems, no les s important, but not par-
ticularly unique to the university context. The fact is that support staff 
hâve a much longer tradition of bargaining collectively under labour 
législation. There hâve been pockets of organized support staff within 
Canadian universities for a number 
of years and collective bargaining 
by thèse groups has not given rise 
to spécial problems, except for 
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one particular case, widely regarded as an aberration*. Support staff 
hâve generally regarded their relationship with the university as that 
of employer and employée, and consequently, hâve seen no problem 
in treating the university as they would any other employer. Collective 
bargaining by support staff, moreover, is usually subject to the discipline 
of an external market, since many support staff are capable of per-
forming their jobs outside of the university. Consequently, support staff 
face many of the same problems as other organized groups of employées 
outside of the university. 
The adoption of collective bargaining by faculty, however, gives 
rise to problems of a more novel nature, and thèse problems hâve created 
certain dilemmas for faculty — dilemmas that remain unresolved. Thèse 
dilemmas reflect a certain ambivalence to collective bargaining on the 
part of many faculty members. Although faculty hâve become increas-
ingly aware of the need for collective action, they don't appear to hâve 
embraced enthusiastically traditional collective bargaining procédures. 
This lack of enthusiasm has resulted in a search by some faculty groups 
for alternatives to collective bargaining procédures. In Ontario, the On-
tario Confédération of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA) and 
Ontario university présidents hâve been discussing a two-stage provincial 
salary negotiation System, 2 the first stage involving the negotiation of 
an agreed recommendation by OCUFA and the Council of Ontario Uni-
versities (COU), the second stage involving the présentation of that 
agreed recommendation through the existing buffer body, the Ontario 
Council of University Affairs, to the government. This System of negotia-
tion would embrace only the matters of faculty rémunération and fac-
ulty complément, while ail other issues would be resolved locally. The 
search for alternatives has not been confined to Ontario. The faculty 
association at the University of British Columbia is reported to be engaged 
in studying the différent rôles of collective action, only one of thèse being 
1
 National Union of Public Employées v. Governors of the University of 
Alberta (1962), 63 CLLC 1122 (B.LR.) ; (1963), 42 W.W.R. 560 (Alta. S.C.), An 
excellent commentary on this case is found in ADELL, Collective Bargaining Rights 
for Faculty at the University of Alberta, report prepared for Association of the 
Académie Staff of the University of Alberta, August 12, 1974. 
2
 « Progress Report from Ad Hoc OCUFA/Presidents Working Group, » 
Toronto, March 19, 1975. 
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collective bargaining under the Labour Code 3. What appears to be hap-
pening is that faculty, although regarding collective action as being the 
only way of halting the détérioration of their économie position, at the 
same time are concerned that their own unique position within the insti-
tution and within the community as a whole be maintained. The funda-
mental dilemma of faculty appears to be this — is it better to protect 
their économie position at the possible risk of jeopardizing their présent 
status or it k better to préserve the présent status at the risk of further 
détérioration in their économie position ? There are, in fact, a number 
of facets to this fundamental dilemma, and I will now attempt to des-
cribe them. 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Faculty generally regard themselves as being more than mère 
employées of their institution, seeing themselves as « professionals ». Al-
though it is difficult to define the word « professional » when it is used 
in this wider sensé, it can at least be said that it indicates a particular 
attitude by faculty toward their respective institutions. Most faculty see 
the relationship as being looser than that of employer-employée. Faculty 
regard themselves as possessing spécial skills and knowledge and expect 
that they will be given a wide latitude in which to apply their spécial 
expertise. The faculty member's committment to his particular discipline 
may be as great, or greater, as his committment to the university. There 
is the expectation that the faculty member's performance will be judged 
by the results achieved and not by a simple calculation of the hours 
spent on the job. The faculty member places a heavy emphasis on the 
récognition of merit, expecting that individual merit will be recognized 
and rewarded financially by the institution. Not only does the faculty 
member expect to be recognized by the university, there is also the 
expectation that récognition and financial reward may corne from out-
side the university, and that thèse benefits should accrue solely to the 
benefit of the faculty member. Royalties, lecture fées, consulting fées 
are ail regarded as being the property of the individual faculty member 
rather than the university. 
3 CAUT Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 3, December 1974. I was informed subséquent 
to the préparation of this paper that the U.B.C. Faculty Association in a close vote 
has opted for a « spécial plan, » involving collective action outside of the Labour 
Code. 
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Underlying this notion of professionalism is a very substantial 
component of individualism. A dilemma facing faculty is whether col-
lective bargaining is to be bought at the expense of sacrificing some of 
this individualism. This dilemma is reflected by a number of concerns. 
One is what I call the « punch-clock bogey » — this is the fear among 
some groups that collective bargaining will lead to a detailed régulation 
of the relationship between faculty and the institution, especially in 
respect to hours of work. Another aspect of this dilemma is the concern 
that collective bargaining will interfère with merit rewards and market 
differentials, ail faculty being reduced to some monetary lowest com-
mon denominator. It should be pointed out, however, that collective 
bargaining, although obviously based on the principle of collective action, 
is not necessarily incompatible with individualism, provided that the 
bargaining parties agrée to allow some scope for individualized treatment 
of faculty. A collective agreement need not provide for detailed rég-
ulation of hours of work and the récent Canadian expérience seems to 
indicate that this has not yet happened. 
The problem of merit rewards and market differentials is more 
vexing. On this matter the interests of ail faculty are not identical, as in 
the case of hours of work. Faculty as a collective could bargain to 
restrict individualized salary increases by reducing the discretionary 
component of the salary increase. Whether this happens will dépend in 
part on faculty confidence in the assessment of merit. If faculty consider 
that salary distinctions are based on merit and not favouritism, then it 
is likely that collective agreements will provide for some part of the 
salary increase to be paid on a discretionary basis. 
Market differentials pose an even more difficult problem, since they 
cannot be justified by the internai value System of the institution but 
only by extern al market forces. The majority of faculty may resent more 
money being paid to a small group of faculty simply because they are 
marketable, and may not wish to bargain for market differentials for 
this minority. On the other hand, the collective bargaining strength of 
faculty is very largely dépendent on the présence in the university of 
persons for which there is some outside demand. If the small group of 
marketable faculty were to leave the university for outside opportunities, 
the collective économie strength of faculty could be seriously impaired. 
What could happen is that some compromise would be reached whereby 
market differentials would remain but might not represent what a market-
able faculty member could achieve through individual bargaining. 
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Faculty concern about merit pay and market differentials indicates 
that there may be some incompatibility between the principles of col-
lective bargaining and long-established faculty attitudes. It is apparent 
that many faculty still place great value on individualism and, conse-
quently, distrust collective action. Yet, on the other hand, there is a 
growing realization among faculty that some form of collective action 
may be necessary in order to maintain their économie position. 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN FACULTY EXERCISE OF MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY 
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
One very important aspect of the relationship between faculty and 
their respective institution is the désire of faculty to participate in the 
running of the institution. This désire has been recognized, to a greater 
or less extent, by most post-secondary institutions. Traditional collective 
bargaining procédures, on the other hand, are based on the premise that 
there is a clearcut dichotomy between the interests of employer and the 
interests of employées. The question is whether there is an incompati-
bility between collective bargaining and faculty participation in running 
the institution. Will faculty hâve to choose between collective bar-
gaining and the exercise of their quasi-managerial rôle ? My colleague, 
Bernard Adell, has recently made the point that the récent expérience 
in Canadian universities does not indicate any conflict between col-
lective bargaining and faculty participation in governing institutions4. 
In fact, lack of participation at some institutions appears to hâve caused 
faculty to turn to collective bargaining in order to assert faculty power. 
Once faculty power has become established, however, there still remains 
the question of whether, over the long run, collective bargaining by fac-
ulty may undermine the rôle it plays in the governance of the institution. 
Can faculty engage in the bluff and pressure tactics of collective bar-
gaining while at the same time engage in the more reasoned and less 
adverserial délibérations of the governing councils of the institution ? 5 
One answer is that the two exercises would be performed by différent 
groups of faculty, but this still raises the possibility of a dichotomy 
4 ADELL, « The Légal Framework of Faculty Collective Bargaining : Some 
Short Questions and Some Long Answers, » paper presented to the University and 
the Law Conférence, Dalhousie University, March 1, 1975, at p. 15. 
5 This question is raised by John CRISPO in « Collective Bargaining by Pro-
fessionals : advisability, practicability and feasibility, » CAUT Bulletin, Vol. 23, 
No. 6, May 1975. 
SOME UNRESOLVED DILEMMAS 667 
developing between thèse two groups of faculty. Another answer is that 
real bargaining is not likely to take place within the institution but out-
side with government, and that faculty and administration are allies who 
should form a common front against the true adversary, government. This 
appears to be one justification for the two-tier proposai now being con-
sidered in Ontario. The difficulty with this answer is that it contem-
plâtes a procédure quite différent than traditional collective bargaining 
conducted between an employer and its employées. 
A further manifestation of the conflict between collective bargaining 
and the exercise of managerial authority within the post-secondary 
institution is the problem of exclusions from the bargaining unit. The 
difficulty of applying the traditional collective bargaining model to 
institutions of higher éducation has been aptly described by the Chair-
man of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board in the Vancouver 
City Collège cases6, when he pointed out « the uneasy relationship » 
between the two Systems of authority within the university — « the col-
légial and the bureaucratie ». The fact is that, because of the idea of 
collégial authority, it is very difficult to détermine where traditional man-
agerial authority begins. Nevertheless, the conventional collective bar-
gaining model requires that this type of distinction be made, and a 
managerial class be identified. This identification may create, or at least 
encourage, a managerial — employée dichtomy within the académie 
community. If such a dichtomy does resuit, it could mean a tightening 
of the managerial structure and a lessening of the rôle played by fac-
ulty in the running of the institution. In other words, the university 
structure may hâve to be altered in order to mesh with the collective 
bargaining structure. 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN JOB SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Académie posts at collèges and universities hâve usually been 
among the more economically secure positions in this country. Until 
quite recently, académie freedom has been of greater importance to fac-
ulty than économie security, reflecting a situation where faculty dis-
missals were unlikely to be motivated by financial exigencies. Post-secon-
dary institutions in most parts of the country are now facing severe finan-
cial restraints imposed by a shift of governmental spending priorities. 
Resort to collective bargaining by faculty is, at least in part, a reaction 
6 [1974] 1 Canadian L.R.B.R. 298. 
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to this financial situation. The impact of collective bargaining on the 
traditional job security of faculty, however, remains to be determined. 
From the perspective of académie freedom, collective bargaining 
is likely to enhance the job security of individual faculty. Fair procédures, 
if not already availbale, are likely to be the subject of collective bar-
gaining. Faculty bargaining agents, moreover, are likely to be disposed 
to provide vigorius représentation for individual faculty, having an insti-
tutional interest in being the champion of faculty rights. From the point 
of view of the économie trade-offs that will be made at the bargaining 
table, collective bargaining could very well reduce the traditional 
job security of faculty. Given the current financial restraints facing 
post-secondary institutions in some Canadian jurisdictions, a possible 
trade-off could be, not just more money for more work, but 
more money for fewer jobs. Certainly financial restraints hâve had 
this effect in other collective bargaining situations, both in the private 
and public sectors. The fact is that the success of the bargaining agent 
is usually measured in terms of the size of the increase of wages and 
fringe benefits, not in terms of the number of jobs saved. As long as the 
majority of the members of the bargaining unit stand to gain financially, 
there is a tendency to ignore the fact that a small number of fellow 
workers will hâve to be laid-off. Although this unpalatable choice is the 
resuit of governmental policies of financial restraint, and not collective 
bargaining, faculty through its bargaining agent might still be forced 
to make a conscious, and uncomfortable, choice between maintaining 
salaries and maintaining jobs. 
If the choice is improving salaries, as I think it will be, there is the 
further problem of how to choose those faculty that must go. Most col-
lective bargaining agreements ties job security with seniority, but is this 
rule-of-thumb appropriate for post-secondary institutions where greater 
emphasis is placed on merit ? 7 It is quite possible that if the seniority 
rule were to be applied strictly, our post-secondary institutions would 
lose much of their vitality, as the flow of junior faculty into thèse insti-
tutions is reversed. The seniority rule, moreover, would interfère with 
récent hiring policies designed to provide greater female représentation 
7
 This question is not meant to suggest that there is any less emphasis on 
seniority at those universities where collective bargaining procédures do not apply. 
In fact, présent methods of rémunération and appointaient are weighted very 
heavily in favour of the more senior at thèse institutions. 
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on faculty. A very important question is whether collective bargaining 
can deal effectively with the problems posed by the current threat to 
job security. 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN AVOIDANCE OF CONFRONTATION WITH 
GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Perhaps the most serious dilemma faced by faculty is the question 
of whether the paymaster, the government, should be confronted directly 
in the collective bargaining process. There are at least two aspects to 
this problem. The first is a concern that, if the government is the bar-
gaining adversary, the quid pro quo of any wage increase will be much 
closer control of post-secondary institutions by the government. It is 
quite possible that this concern is exaggerated. Although it is clear that 
staff entitlement and faculty workload will be considered by government 
when dealing with faculty demands for higher wages, it is less clear 
that bargaining over work-load will lead to any greater supervision of 
institutions and faculty than exists, or is likely to occur anyway. 
A more serious concern is the possibility of an impasse developing 
between faculty and government. Would a public confrontation between 
government and faculty work to the disadvantage of faculty ? Many fac-
ulty appear to regard the faculty strike as unworkable, arguing that public 
opinion would be against faculty, either beçause a large section of the 
public would regard faculty as clearly being overpaid, or, even worse, 
because the public would not care whether faculty withdrew their services. 
The validity of thèse arguments can only be tested by a faculty strike, 
but I hâve strong doubts as to whether any test will occur. The fact is, 
that at the présent time, faculty appears to hâve no taste for strike action. 
If this is the case, then is it possible for faculty collective bargaining to 
be anything more than an exercise in futility ? 
Confrontation with government could be avoided, of course, by 
confining collective bargaining to negotiations between faculty and 
individual institutions. But without the présence of the paymaster at the 
bargaining table this might be merely an exercise in shadow bargaining. 
Direct confrontation with the government might also be avoided by 
resort to interest arbitration. Although this procédure would probably 
hâve some appeal to faculty, governments might be reluctant to delegate 
a part of their fiscal authority to an arbitrator, especially where they 
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now can unilaterally détermine the market for university faculty.8 
The fact is that, if collective bargaining procédures are to be effective, 
it will be necessary for faculty to confront government directly, since 
it is governments that establish the market for faculty services. There 
is no doubt that this is an uncomfortable prospect for faculty. 
A further possibility is for a two-tier system of negotiations such 
as is being presently studied by OCUFA and the Ontario university 
présidents. This system contemplâtes that internai province-wide negot-
iations between faculty and the universities would précède negotiations 
with the government. A common position would be reached and this 
position would be presented to the government through the buffer body, 
OCUA. This type of system has been subject to some rather searching 
criticisms. Leaving aside the problem of the effect of such a system on 
the autonomy of individual institutions, there is the very basic question 
of whether it is a collective bargaining system at ail. At the first level of 
negotiation, can it be said that the parties are true bargaining adversaries ? 
There would appear to be little incentive for the universities to resist 
agreeing upon a common position more favourable to faculty. Nego-
tiations at the second level, moreover, do not appear to correspond to 
the traditional collective bargaining model. On one side of the table 
would be a common front of employers and employées, and on the other 
side of the table would be government. What procédures would be in-
voked if an impasse were reached ? The document setting out the pro-
posai is less than clear on this matter. It is doubtful that the universities 
as employers would actively encourage a withdrawal of faculty services. 
If so,.then the second level of negotiations appears to be more an exer-
cise in lobbying than in collective bargaining. 
This two-tier system of negotiations appears to be a manifestation 
of the current dilemma of faculty. Faculty realize that collective action 
is necessary in order to maintain their économie position, but they are 
concerned that normal collective bargaining may impair their traditional 
position in society. Proponents of the two-tier system see a system that 
would allow for greater collective faculty participation in the détermina-
tion of salary, but which would not constitute traditional collective bar-
gaining. Others see the system as being rather an unhappy compromise 
between collective bargaining and traditional methods of salary deter-
8
 This point is made by CRISPO in « Collective Bargaining by Professionals : 
advisability, practicability and feasibility, » supra. 
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mination. The opponents can be divided into two groups : those that 
say the System opens the door for collective bargaining and those that 
say the system is not sufficiently similar to collective bargaining to be 
workable. This basic dilemma, however, remains unreasolved as faculty 
grapple with the question of whether they should go ail the way with 
collective bargaining. 
Le dilemme des professeurs d'université : 
oui ou non à la négociation collective ? 
La négociation collective chez les professeurs des universités et des collèges 
canadiens est devenue un fait acquis, mais les professeurs demeurent toutefois 
perplexes à ce sujet. Bien qu'ils soient conscients de la nécessité d'une action 
collective, ils ne semblent pas s'être engagés avec enthousiasme dans les procédures 
de la négociation traditionnelle, plus particulièrement en Ontario et en Colombie 
britannique où l'on a recherché des formules de remplacement. Ce qui arrive, c'est 
que les professeurs, tout en considérant que l'action collective est le seul moyen 
de mettre un frein à la dégradation de leur condition économique, se préoccupent 
en même temps de leur situation particulière tant dans l'institution que dans la 
société. Le dilemme qui se pose à eux est le suivant : est-il préférable de défendre 
leur condition économique au risque de mettre en péril leur statut actuel ou vaut-il 
mieux conserver celui-ci au risque d'une détérioration plus marquée de leur position 
économique ? Ce dilemme comporte plusieurs facettes. 
Les professeurs se considèrent comme des « professionnels » bien plus que 
comme des employés et s'attendent à jouir de beaucoup de latitude dans l'exécution 
de leurs tâches. Sous-jacente à cette notion de « professionalisme », se cache une 
forte dose d'individualisme. Faut-il s'orienter vers la négociation collective en 
sacrifiant un peu d'individualisme ? On redoute qu'elle conduise à une réglementa-
tion circonstanciée des rapports entre le corps professoral et l'institution, surtout 
en ce qui a trait aux heures de travail. On craint aussi qu'elle contrecarre la 
fixation des traitements selon le mérite et en tenant compte des taux du marché 
du travail extérieur. 
Toutefois, la négociation collective n'est pas nécessairement incompatible avec 
l'esprit d'individualisme à condition que les parties acceptent qu'on permette jusqu'à 
un certain point l'établissement de traitements fondés sur la valeur de l'individu. 
Une convention collective n'exige pas obligatoirement non plus une réglementation 
stricte des heures de travail. Les expériences contraires ne manquent pas. Que 
la rémunération au mérite se continue, la chose dépend du degré de confiance 
des professeurs dans l'appréciation du mérite. Si les professeurs se rendent compte 
que l'appréciation du mérite est équitable, il est concevable que les conventions 
collectives déterminent qu'une certaine tranche des salaires soit établie d'une façon 
discrétionnaire. 
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La question des taux de salaire sur les marchés du travail pose un problème 
plus difficile, étant donné qu'on ne peut les justifier dans les cadres du système 
de valeur de l'institution, mais uniquement en faisant intervenir les forces exté-
rieures du marché. Même si la masse des professeurs peut ne pas être désireuse 
de négocier un traitement spécial pour ceux qui peuvent obtenir davantage sur 
le marché, la chose peut s'imposer afin d'empêcher le prestige d'une faculté de 
se dégrader par le départ d'une partie de ses effectifs. On pourrait y arriver par 
des compromis qui confirmeraient certains écarts. 
Un aspect important des rapports entre les professeurs et l'institution réside 
dans la volonté de ceux-ci de participer à la direction de l'université. Est-ce 
que le processus ordinaire de négociation collective, fondé sur la prémisse qu'il 
doit exister une dichotomie bien tranchée entre les intérêts de l'employeur et 
les intérêts des employés, est incompatible avec la participation du corps pro-
fessoral à la direction de l'université ? D'une part, on peut répondre que la 
participation à la négociation collective et la participation à la direction de l'ins-
titution touchera des groupes différents de professeurs, mais ceci soulève la 
possibilité de voir se développer une dichotomie entre ces deux groupes de pro-
fesseurs. D'autre part, cependant, il peut arriver que la véritable négociation ne 
se fasse pas avec l'université, mais avec le gouvernement. La difficulté serait alors 
qu'elle supposerait une forme de négociation fort différente de la négociation 
traditionnelle entre un employeur et ses salariés. 
Une autre source de conflit peut se soulever : les exclusions des unités de 
négociations. À cause de la conception que l'on a de l'autorité à l'université, il 
est difficile de savoir où commence véritablement l'exercice de l'autorité. La négo-
ciation collective traditionnelle exige une identification précise de l'autorité, d'où 
il peut résulter que la structure de l'université doive être modifiée de façon à 
l'ajuster à la structure de la négociation collective. 
Les institutions d'enseignement secondaire un peu partout au pays font face 
aujourd'hui à de rigoureuses contraintes financières par suite de changements dans 
l'ordre des priorités de l'État. L'effet de la négociation collective sur la sécurité 
d'emploi traditionnelle des professeurs reste donc à mesurer. Du point de vue 
de la liberté d'enseignement, elle pourrait assurer la sécurité des professeurs pris 
individuellement parce que les agents négociateurs auront intérêt à se faire les 
champions des droits des professeurs, mais si l'on considère la question sous l'angle 
des compromis économiques à la table des négociations, la sécurité d'emploi pour-
rait être laissée pour compte. Il s'est avéré que le succès d'un agent négociateur 
se mesure en augmentations de salaire et en avantages sociaux et non par le 
nombre des emplois qu'il réussit à sauvegarder. Tout comme les agents négociateurs 
dans les autres secteurs, les agents négociateurs des professeurs d'université préfé-
reront l'amélioration des traitements au maintien des emplois. Ceci soulève le 
problème du choix des professeurs qui devront partir. N'est-il pas normal, par 
ailleurs, de relier la sécurité d'emploi à l'ancienneté ? Si le critère de l'ancienneté 
est appliqué rigoureusement, il est possible que les institutions post-secondaires 
perdent beaucoup de leur valeur. Le critère d'ancienneté contrecarra en outre les 
politiques nouvelles d'engagement qui visent à accroître la représentation féminine 
au sein des corps professoraux. 
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L'obstacle le plus sérieux peut-être qui se pose aux professeurs, c'est la 
participation directe du paie-maître, c'est-à-dire du gouvernement, à la négociation. 
Un des dangers, c'est que le gouvernement, s'il est le vis-à-vis, sera enclin à 
exercer un contrôle plus strict sur les institutions post-secondaires. Ce danger 
peut être exagéré, puisqu'il n'est pas clair que la négociation collective aura pour 
résultat de mener à une surveillance plus marquée des institutions que celle qui 
existe déjà ou qui adviendra de toute façon. 
Plus dangereuse cependant la possibilité d'une impasse entre les professeurs 
et l'État. Beaucoup de professeurs considèrent la grève impraticable, soit parce 
qu'une bonne partie de la population estime les professeurs surpayés, soit qu'un 
débrayage de leur part lui indiffère. À l'heure actuelle, les professeurs n'ont pas 
tellement le coût de faire la grève. Si telle est la situation, la grève peut-elle être 
autre chose qu'une action puérile ? 
On pourrait éviter une confrontation avec le gouvernement en confinant la 
négociation collective à l'institution. Mais sans la présence du paie-maître à la 
table des négociations, celles-ci ne peuvent être qu'un simulacre. La confrontation 
directe peut encore être écartée par l'arbitrage des conflits d'intérêts. Le gouver-
nement, cependant, peut avoir de la réticence à déléguer une partie de son autorité 
de gestionnaire à un arbitre, principalement là où il a la possobilité de fixer 
unilatéralement les traitements. En fait, pour que la négociation soit vraiment 
efficace, les professeurs doivent affronter le gouvernement. 
Une autre possibilité, c'est le recours au système de négociations à double 
palier qui est actuellement à l'étude en Ontario. Ce système vise à des négociations 
provinciales entre les professeurs et les universités au niveau provincial qui précé-
deraient les négociations avec le gouvernement. On en arriverait à un accord 
qu'on présenterait ensuite au gouvernement par un organisme-tampon. Question 
capitale : s'agirait-il là d'une négociation collective ? Au premier palier, il est 
difficile de considérer les parties comme des opposants, puisqu'ils n'y a guère 
d'intérêt pour les universités à résister aux positions des professeeurs. Au deuxième 
palier, on aurait un front commun des employeurs et des employés qui négocieraient 
contre le gouvernement. À quels moyens de solution pourra-t-on recourir si l'on 
tombe dans une impasse ? Il est fort douteux que les universités en tant qu'elles 
sont employeurs favorisent la suppression des services. S'il en était ainsi le deuxième 
palier de négociation équivraudrait plus à une forme de lobby qu'à une véritable 
négociation collective. Ce système de négociation à double balcon serait-il autre 
chose que la manifestation au grand jour du dilemme actuel ? 
Les professeurs se rendent compte qu'une action collective est nécessaire pour 
assurer leur situation économique, mais ils sont conscients qu'elle peut compromet-
tre leur position sociale traditionnelle. Ce dilemme demeure sans solution au 
moment où les professeurs se trouvent aux prises avec la question de savoir s'ils 
doivent s'engager pour de bon dans la négociation collective traditionnelle. 
